University of Dayton

eCommons
School of Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

2015

Global Income Inequality and the Potential for
Global Democracy: A Functionalist Analysis
Andrew L. Strauss
University of Dayton, astrauss1@udayton.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/law_fac_pub
Part of the International Law Commons
eCommons Citation
Strauss, Andrew L., "Global Income Inequality and the Potential for Global Democracy: A Functionalist Analysis" (2015). School of
Law Faculty Publications. 2.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/law_fac_pub/2

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in School of Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact frice1@udayton.edu,
mschlangen1@udayton.edu.

6

GLOBAL ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
AND THE POTENTIAL FOR GLOBAL
DEMOCRACY: A FUNCTIONALIST
ANALYSIS
Andrew Strauss

INTRODUCTION: EINSTEIN AND FREUD
Sigmund Freud, from whose book Civilization and its Discontents l this
volume takes its inspiration, engaged in an exchange of letters with
Albert Einstein in the early 1930s. 2 Einstein, concerned that technological advances meant that war might destroy humanity, attempted to
engage Freud in a dialogue and in the forming of an organization of
moral and intellectual elites to promote his cause of world government.
Freud answered Einstein's call for thoughtful correspondence, but was
not optimistic about a program for world government. After all, as he
had argued in Discontents, humans had aggressive instincts and impulses
that were at odds with global harmony, and Freud was doubtful, given
the then state of cultural evolution, that these could be contemporaneously overcome in the furtherance of an effective world authority.
Helping shape the distinctive perspectives of Einstein and Freud
are contrasting methodological assumptions, each of which has in
various guises been reflected in the Western philosophical tradition
I would like to thank Barbara Eckman for her very helpful research assistance
with this chapter.
1 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, in James Strachey (trans.),
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol.
XXI (1961) .
2 See Why War? A Correspondence Between Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud
(1991 edition) .
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since the time of the Greeks. Einstein, the rationalist, presupposed
with Kant and many others the possibility that human behavior and
society in general could be molded to the dictates of human reason. 3
Freud, an heir to the psychological tum in our understanding of
ourselves that began decidedly with Hume, and was most powerfully
advanced by Nietzsche, saw our passions and other hidden forces from
within our psyches as the central drivers of our social institutions.
Today most students of global institutions implicitly reject the
assumptions of both Einstein and Freud. The World Federalists,
who have long followed a political strategy derived from their
Kantian belief that a rational response to the human condition
should lead nations to suspend their rivalries and create a world
federal state, are distinctly out of step. 4 Likewise, most professional
observers of global institutions (behavioral economists aside) eschew
a Freudian understanding of such institutions as an amalgam of the
complex psychology that make up individuals.
Rather, what is implicit in the approach of most observers today is a
third method that might be thought of as that of the political scientist.
This method, which can be traced back most definitively to Machiavelli, assumes that social institutions are the sum total of an underlying
sodal dynamic resulting from a kind of reductionist notion of collective
and individual self-interests often associated with Hobbes.
Functionalism, as originally conceptualized by David Mitrany in
the 1930s, is informed by such an understanding. 5 For Mitrany and
his later adherents, international organizations emerge as a result of
the needs of global actors to tackle specific problems that cannot be

3

4

Part of Einstein's purpose, however, in attempting to enlist Freud comes out of
a recognition of the importance of the psychological dimension to the change
he was promoting. See See Why War? , p. 2 ("The ill success, despite their
obvious sincerity, of all the efforts made during the last decade to reach this
goal [of a supranational organization] leaves us no room to doubt that strong
psychological factors are at work which paralyze these efforts").
For a comprehensive history of the world federalism movement, including the
development and evolution of the ideology of world federalism, see Joseph
Preston Baratta, The Politics of World Federation: From World Federalism to
Global Governance (2004).

5

See generally David Mitrany, The Progress of International Government (1933).
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solved in the absence of international cooperation. Unlike most world
federalists or other rational idealists, they do not assume the workability of grand schemes for global governance, but rather, for them,
global change comes about as a result of people individuallY and
collectively pursuing concrete self-interested objectives. Thus, to take
one example, for functionalists, the International Civil Aviation
Organization was created by states in 1944 because they could not
independently secure the safety of their newly airbound citizens over
the global commons. 6 Contemporary regime theorists such as Robert
Keohane and Joseph Nye have furtl1er developed and refined the idea
that states create international regimes in self-interested response to
collective action problems.?
The thesis that I wish to develop in this chapter is that a functionalist view of the development of global institutions suggests that the
structural inequalities in global income that were a primary cause of
the global economic crisis of 2008, and that continue to endanger the
world economy, have the potential to provide the political preconditions for a global regime that can help redress those inequalities. To
do so, however, such a regime must empower the less economically
well off through representation, and the regime itself must have the
practical ability to influence global economic policy. Such a regime,
I will argue, must be fundamentally democratic in its character. If it
were to be brought into existence, a democratic regime, representative of the global public, would likely weigh in on many issues beyond
income inequality. Environmental concerns, including climate
change, human rights, and international conflict resolution are only
a few of the areas where a parliament might be argued to have salutary
value. A focus on economic inequality as a matter of great saliency
today, however, presents a useful case study for both the political
viability and utility of such an institution.

6

7

David Mackenzie, ICAO: A lliSfOlY of rhe llllel'llariollal Civil Aviarioll

OrgallizaLion (2010).
See for example Roben Keohane and Joseph Nyc, "Between Centralization
and Fragmentation: The C lub Model of Multilateral Cooperation and
Problems of Democratic Legitimacy," avai lable at http: //papers.ssrn.com/soI3/
papers.cfmabstract_id=262175.
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I THE MACROECONOMIC PROBLEM OF GLOBAL
INCOME INEQUALITY AND THE GREAT RECESSION
A strong - even compelling - case can be made that income inequality
worldwide was a primary cause of the 2008 economic crisis and that it
continues to endanger the global economy. The thesis that income
inequality poses a danger to economic health lays claim to a distinguished pedigree . To name two of the inequality thesis's most notable
twentieth-century adherents, Marriner Eccles, a Federal Reserve
Chairman during the Roosevelt administration, and the famed economist John Kenneth Galbraith, both saw the rise in inequality in the
1920s as a major cause of the Great Depression. 8 Among the many
contemporary observers supporting the view that income inequality
was among the primary causes of the Great Recession, former IMF
Chief Economist Raghuram Rajan makes the argument forcefully in
his 2010 book Faultlines 9 as does former Labor Secretary Robert
Reich in his 2011 book Afiershocl~, the Next Economy and Amen'ca's
Future. 10
While the varied proponents of the inequality thesis have different
emphasis and perspectives, they all share a common grounding in
John Maynard Keynes's depression-era upending of classical
8

9

10

For EccJcs's views, see Marriner Eccles, Beckoning Fronciers (1951); for
Galbraith's views, see John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash, 1929 (1954) .
Raghuram G. Rajan, Fault Lines: How Hidden Fraaums Still Threaten the World
Economy (2010) .
Robert B. Reich, Aftershock: The Next Economy & America's Future (2011). See
also Gustav Horn et. aI., "From the Financial Crisis to the World Economic
Crisis: The Role of Inequality," IMK Policy Brief, Institut fur
Makroi:ikonomie und Konjukturforschung (2009), p. 10. Other economic
observers sounded the alarm before 2007. See Thomas 1. Palley, "Economic
Contradictions Coming Home to Roost? Does the U.S. Economy Face a
Long-Term Aggregate Demand Generation Problem?," J. Post Keynesian
Econ ., 25 (2002), p. 9; Heather Boushey and Christian E. Weller, "Inequality
and Household Economic Hardship in the United States of America, Working
Papers," United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2006);
Robert H . Franck, Falling Behind: How Rising Inequality Harms the Middle Class
(2007); Robert Pollin, "The Growth of U.S. Household Debt: Demand-side
Influences," J. Macroec07lOntics, 10 (1988), p. 231.

198

International Law and Its Discontents

economic theory. II At the root of the Keynesian understanding is the
notion that for an economy to function at full capacity, sufficient
aggregate demand for goods and services must exist to absorb that
capacity. 12 If for some reason, such demand ceases to exist, producers
will respond by lowering production, and cancelling or putting on
hold plans to invest in expansion. 13 Lower production and less invest~
ment means the elimination of workers who can no longer be product~
ively utilized. 14 In what becomes a vicious cycle, the newly jobless
workers are forced to cut back on their own consumption, further
reducing demand and causing further economic contraction. 15
The reason that high levels of income inequality affect aggregate
demand and begin this unfortunate cycle is that the wealthier people
become, the lower their marginal propensity to consume. Every add~
itional dollar obtained by someone who is living at the subsistence
level will tend to be spent on basic necessities, such as feeding the
family or paying the rent, while an additional dollar garnered by
someone of wealth, whose consumer needs are likely to already be
mostly satiated, is more likely to be saved. 16 Thus, as income
becomes highly concentrated, wealth is transferred from the less well
off, who will consume, to those better off, who will save, and when
this happens, sustaining the Keynesian demand that drives the econ~
omy becomes problematic. 17
11

12

16

17

See generally John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment Interest
and Monlry (1936) .
Ibid .
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
Ibid., p. 97. There is a good deal of empirical support for this rather selfevident proposition that with increasing wealth there is a diminishing marginal
propensity to consume. See for example Ulrike Stein, "Zur Entwicklung der
Sqarquoten der privaten Haushalte-ein Auswertung von Haushaltsdaten des
SOEP," IMK Working Paper 10 - 2009 (2009) (finding that in 2007 the top
income quartile of Germans had an average saving rate of 15.8 percent, the
second quartile of 9 percent, the third of 8 percent and the bottom of 4.1
percent).
As Keynes put it: "up to the point where full employment prevails, the growth
of capital depends not at all on a low propensity to consume but is, on the
contrary, held back by it; and only in conditions of full employment is a low
propensity to consume conducive to the growth of capital. Moreover,
experience suggests that in existing conditions savings by institutions and
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The period of globalization leading up to the 2008 financial crisis
corresponded to a period of income inequality within countries and
thus very likely established the preconditions for the deficiency in
aggregate global demand I have described. The most common way
economists measure income inequality is with an equation that they
call the Gini Coefficient. Named after Corrado Gini, the Italian
sociologist who worked out its formulation, the Gini coefficient is
used to measure inequality in a frequency distribution. IS Thus, when
applied to income distribution, a Gini coefficient of zero indicates
perfect equality (everyone has the same income), and a Gini coefficient of one indicates maximum inequality (only one person has all
the income). 19
Given the premium that communist ideology put on economic
equality, it is not surprising that countries transitioning away from
planned economies saw their Gini coefficients rise significantly. 20
When China, for example, abandoned its "iron rice bowl policy"
following the reforms of Deng Xiaoping in the 1980's, income
inequality exploded.21 This inequality has become even more pronounced in the last decade leading China to have a Gini coefficient
higher than the United States. 22 This rise in inequality has not been
through sinking funds is more than adequate, and that measures for the
redistribution of incomes in a way likely to raise the prosperity to consume
may prove positively favourable to the growth of capital." John Maynard
Keynes, The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money, pp. 373- 4.
18 Corrado Gini, Van'abilica e Mutabiliui (1912).
19 Corrado Gini, On the Measure of Concentration with Special Reference to Income
and Statistics (1936).
20 See Branco Milanovic and Lire Ersado, "Reform and Inequality During the
Transition: An Analysis Using Panel Household Survey Data, 1990- 2005,"
Policy Research Working Paper 4780, The World Bank Development
Research Group Poverty Team (2008) (examining the rise of income
inequality in 26 post-communist countries during the period from 1990- 2005
and concluding that its scale was unprecedented).
21 OECD, Economic Surveys of China (2010), p. 147.
2 2 Int'l Labour Org. [ILO), "Income Inequality as a Cause of the Great
Recession? A Survey of Current Debates," Conditions of Work and
Employment Series No. 39 (prepared by Till van Treeck and Simon Sturn),
p. 27. One reason for China's high Gini coefficient is the very well-known gap
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limited to transitional economies. Developing countries generally
have tended to experience a significant rise in inequality during the
period of neoliberal globalization which began in 1989. 23
The trend was similar in the developed world. In 2007 the American economy, for example, was roughly 60 percent larger than it was
in the 1970s. Yet, the inflation adjusted income of the median male
worker actually decreased over the period. 24 The missing gains almost
. all found their way to those at the upper end of the income stratum·
The wealthiest 10 percent of Americans went from appropriating
around 35 percent of national income in the 1970s to a full 50 percent
25
in 2007. Even more dramatically, during this period, the noW
infamous upper 1 percent expanded their take of national income
from under 10 percent in the 1970s to 23 percent in 2007. 26
Most other advanced industrial countries followed this same trajectory toward inequality. According to the OEeD, its member states
between relatively high urban and relatively low rural incomes, however,
urban inequality in itself has increased to the point where it is almost as large
as the Gini coefficient for total household incomes in the United States. See
also Edward Wong, "Survey in China Shows a Wide Gap in Income," New
York Times, July 19, 2013, p. A9 (reporting on a Peking University survey
finding that in 2012 households in the top 5 percent income bracket
accounted for 23 percent of China's total household income while those in the
bottom 5 percent accounted for only 0.1 percent and estimating China's Gini
coefficient to be 0.49).
23 See Branko M.ilanovic, "Can We Discern the Effect of Globalization on
Income Distribution? Evidence from Household Surveys?" World Bank Bcon.
Rev., 19 (2005), p. 21 (describing the increased inequality in developing
countries and suggesting causal factors related to economic openness). But
see, Leonardo Gasparini, Guillermo Cruces and Leopoldo Tornarolli,
"Recent Trends in Income Inequality in Latin America," in Branko M.ilanovic
(ed.) Globalization and Inequality (2012), p. 172 (arguing that inequality has
been decreasing in Latin America over the last five to ten years although it
continues to be among the most unequal regions in the world).
24 See Robert B. Reich, Aftershock, p. 19 (extrapolating earnings figures from
Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census Bureau figures).
25 See Emmanuel Saez, "Striking it Richer, The Evolution of Top Incomes in
the United States (Updated with 2011 estimates)" (2013), available at http://
emlab. berkeley. edu/-saezlsaez-UStopincomes-2011 .pdf).
26 Ibid.
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had an average Gini coefficient of 0.29 in the mid-1980s. 2 7 By the late
2000s, however, this average had increased by almost 10 percent to
0.316, having risen in seventeen of the twenty-two OECD countries
for which sufficient data is available.28 It grew by more than 4 percent
in Finland, Germany, Israel, Luxemberg, New Zealand, Sweden, and
the United States. 29 The only exceptions were Turkey, Greece,
France, Hungary, and Belgium which registered either no increase
or small declines in their Gini coefficients. 3D
Certain high Gini coefficient countries, most notably Germany,
Japan, and especially China, lacking sufficient internal Keynesian
demand to absorb their excess production, attempted to compensate
through exports? 1
The United States in particular was a net absorber of global
surplus production. Given its own increasingly unequal distribution
of income, and the corresponding financial constraint on those
middle and poorer Americans, with the highest marginal propensity
to consume, such consumption had to be financed. As is now well
known, such financing to a great extent took the form of easy access to
consumer credit, most characterized by home mortgage loans.32
In the expansion of consumer credit, the United States was again not
alone. In the years leading up to the Great Recession, consumer debt
soared throughout the industrialized world. According to the International Monetary Fund, between 2002 and 2007, the ratio of household debt to income went up by an average of 39 percent until peaking at
138 percent. 33 In Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and
Norway, debt rose to more than 200 percent of household income. 34

27

28
31

32

33

34

OECD, Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising (2011), p. 22.
Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
See Michael Pettis, The Great Rebalancing: Trade, Conflict, and the Perilous
Road Ahead for the World Economy (2013), pp. 1- 26.
Raghuram G . Rajan, Fault Lines, pp. 21-45. A significant part of global
surplus production was (and continues to be) absorbed by the U .S.
government financed by large federal deficits .
"World Economic Outlook: Growth Resuming, Dangers Remain,"
International Monetary Fund 89 (2012), available at www.imf.orglexternall
pu bslftlweo/20 12/0 1/pdfltext. pdf).
Ibid .
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Of course, global aggregate demand could not be maintained
indefinitely by consumers taking on higher and higher levels of debt,
and when the inevitable happened, and consumers began to default
(triggered by the subprime home mortgage collapse in the United
States), the demand necessary to fuel the economy could no longer be
su stained. The most enduring economic contraction since the Great
Depression was upon us. Some governments stepped in to create
demand with old fashioned Keynesian fiscal (government spending)
and monetary policy (central bank lowering of interest rates to
encourage consumption and investment), but maintaining the political will for those policies has been an uphill battle. Now, in this
period of economic difficulty, both those who have been disadvantaged by the increasingly unequal distribution of income, as well as
those who have been advantaged, have a joint interest in reviving the
global economy. It is to understanding the practical case for global
democracy as an impetus to sustaining such a revival that I will
now turn.

II GLOBALIZATION AND THE PROBLEM OF UNEQUAL
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
The increasing inequality of income around the world that we have
just chronicled poses significant questions of distributive justice. One
does not have to go so far as John Rawls - whose famous difference
principle holds that income disparities are only justifiable to the extent
they improve the lot of the least well off - to recognize the ethical
challenge posed by such large-scale inequality. 35 The argument that
I wish to make in this chapter is not, however, fundamentally normative in character. Rather, with reference to functionalist analysis,
I intend to demonstrate that such income inequality provides an
economically instrumental rationale for global democracy.
Significantly contributing to the income inequality phenomenon is
the globalization system that allows industrial enterprises to raise
funds on global exchanges and sell their products to global markets
35

See generally John Rawls, A TheOlY OfJIIslice (rev. cd. 1999), p. 266.
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regardless of where they set up shop. The result is a mismatch
between the realm of the nation-state, whose confines limit the
mobility of most workers, and the transnational realm of footloose
commerce. While workers with specialized skills in global demand
can command generous salaries, less skilled workers, the supply of
which is in global surplus, have lost negotiating leverage . The advantage goes to firms that can keep their compensation in check by
transferring production offshore, or by buying from global suppliers,
who themselves must keep compensation low to match foreign
competitors. 36
Is there a way around globalization's tendency toward exacerbating income inequality? The model of industrial relations that became
most accepted in the twentieth century would answer that question by
looking to governments to establish worker protection laws establishing minimum wages, making termination of employment and plant
closings difficult, and securing collective bargaining rights. 37 The
ability of governments, however, to maintain pro-worker industrial
policies of this kind has itself come under assault by the same competitive dynamics of globalization that pits workers against workers
around the globe. Countries must compete for investment capital,
and countries with more stringent worker protections find themselves
at a competitive disadvantage. 38 The example of worker protective
sclerotic France is often held out as one to be avoided if governments
want to attract the international capital that allows their economies to
flourish. 39

:36

:3

:3

:3

7

8

9

See for example Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequah'ty: How Today's Divided
Society Endangers our Future (2012), p. 60 (maintaining that, "[t]he threat of
capital outflow, should workers get too demanding about rights and wages,
keeps workers' wages low").
See generally Bruce E. Kaufmann, The Global Evolution of Industrial Relations:
Events, Ideas and the lIRA (2005).
See for example Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality, p. 60. ("Competition
across countries for investment takes on many forms - not just lowering wages
and weakening worker protections. There is a broader 'race to the bottom,'
trying to ensure that business regulations are weak and taxes are low.")
See for example Steven Erlanger, "Memo From France: A Proud Nation
Halts Its Slow Decline," New Yorh Times, August 25,2013, p. 6.

',,1
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Alternatively, countries could compensate those who have wound
up on the wrong side of the global income divide by resorting to
redistributionist social welfare programs that were also held out as a
model in the twentieth century.40 Unfortunately, however, governments are similarly hampered in their capacity to tax global enterprises to fund such programs by the ease with which they can relocate
41
to more tax friendly jurisdictions that globalization makes possible.
These kinds of constraints on the abilities of individual governments to act alone means that the most promising strategy to counter
increasing inequality in the age of globalization are ones that globally
harmonize worker protections and other social welfare policies. But
putting such policies in place has been elusive. Despite efforts in the
International Labour Organization, the World Trade Organization
and even the G20, at the end of the day, the political will has not
been sufficient to create strong global social welfare standards. On its
face, this is paradoxical. If those lacking in economic privilege had the
political clout to secure the implementation of strong worker protection and redistributionist policies in many countries during the twentieth century, then why couldn't they aggregate their clout to convince
governments collectively to harmonize such policies?
While the answer is not simple, the unique dynamics of the interstate politics that defines the international system is of primary
importance. Before the onslaught ' of globalization, the battle for
worker protections and redistributionist policies were fought separately in each state. If the forces opposing such policies were successful
in one country, it had little impact on the ability of other countries to
pursue such policies. Now, because the competitive dynamics of
globalization described above mean that any harmonization initiative
must secure the participation of all states (or at least all of the states
with any significant productive potential) the forces opposing such

40

41

See for example Harold L. Wilensky, Rich Democracies: Political Economy,
Public Policy and Performance (2002), pp. 211 - 16.
See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality, p. 278. ("Our system of
global competition encourages firms to locate on the basis not of global
efficiency but of tax competition . . . [ilt distorts the global economy and
undermines the ability to impose fair taxation on capital.")
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initiatives have gained a significant advantage. If they can capture
policy in just a few, or even one of the states that are necessary for a
harmonization agreement, they can effectively veto the ability of the
rest of the world to maintain such policies.
To make matters even harder for the forces of worker protections
and equitable redistribution, the architecture of the global system is
not congenial to the ability of citizens to coalesce transnationally.
Within national parliamentary systems, those citizens in the middle
and lower income stratums constitute a large percentage of the electorate, generally allowing them to wield considerable power at the
ballot box. What is more, through the pluralist democratic structures
that are adjunct to parliamentary process,42 such citizens can overcome geography as well as their many other ethnic, religious and
ideological cleavages to join forces on behalf of their common economic interest. 43
The role of citizens in the international system is quite different.
Because international law is created by states, rather than through
parliamentary voting by citizen elected representatives, the interstate
system does not facilitate opportunities for citizens to formally participate in the law making process. 44 Without any institutional structure for bringing disparate communities together, language, ethnicity,
religion, culture, nationalist ideology, and distance all conspire to
make a collective response on behalf of common economic interests
extremely difficult. For the most part, this means that the voices of
those in the middle and lower income stratums are subsumed by
those of their governments, regardless of whether such governments
are captured by the interests of the wealthy or compromised in their
ability to respond to inequality by the dynamics of globalization.
42
43
44

For example, political parties and interest groups that lobby legislative bodies .
See generally David Held, Models of Democracy (2006), pp. 160- 4.
For one of the classic works discussing the limits of citizen politics in the
international system, see Margaret E . Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activist
Beyond Borders (\998). Other scholars have focused on participation by civil
society organizations and epistemic networks in the international system. For
some of the more influential works on participation by civil society
organizations see Jessica T. Mathews, "Powershift," Foreign Aff., Jan.!
Feb. 1997, p . 50; Jackie Smith, Social Movements for Global Democracy (2008).
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III FUNCTIONALISM
Pioneered by David Mitrany, whose writings spanned the period from
the 1930s to the 1970s, functionalism was an attempt to find an
intermediate position in international relations theory between what
it regarded as the utopian legacy of Woodrow Wilson's belief in legally
engineered grand transformations of the global institutional order and
a bleak realist understanding that saw states as immutably locked in a
Hobbesian competition that tended toward war.45 Functionalism
held that international organizations could gradually play an ever
greater role in human affairs as both governments and sub-state actors
came to realize that regulatory matters requiring transnational
cooperation could best be addressed at the transnational level through
international organizations. 46
A defining characteristic of functionalism is the nature of these
organizations. They are to be designed to address the discreet problems that arise in defined areas of governance. By way of examples,
Mitrany pointed to the need globally to coordinate intercontinental
shipping, aviation and broadcasting. 47 Thus, Mitrany's vision was of a
myriad of distinct international organizations all functioning independently in their own realms. As these organizations took on increasing importance, functionalists believed that this would create a
spillover effect. Political actors would gradually come to shift their
political loyalties and activities to the international realm. 48
The primary implements of functionalist analysis were taken up in
the 1950s by Ernst Haas and others to both explain and predict the
transfer of rule-making authority from national governments to the

45
46
47

48

See generally David Mitrany, The Progress of International Government.
See David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (1966), pp. 93- 7
Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (2000) .
See Leon Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration
(1963), p. 5 (explaining from the functionalist perspective, "[p]olitical
integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political
activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states").
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European Union in what came to be called neofunctionalism. 49 Neofunctionalism has in many ways defined the European integrationist
project. Whether in neofunctionalism's prescription for step-by-step
incrementalism that has become the European project's hallmark, or
the early strategic primacy given to the technical governance of economic arrangements, the neo-functionalist canons read like manuals
to the construction of what today has become the European Union. 50
Knocked around by the inevitable vicissitudes of a bold movement
toward continental integration, neofunctionalism eventually fell out
of favor. The most defining moment came in the 1970s when Haas,
himself, declared that the theory was obsolete. 51 After the so-called
"empty chair crisis," precipitated by French President Charles de
Gaulle having put the brakes on the pace of integration in the mid

For Haas's classic book inaugurating neofunctionalism, see Ernst Haas, The
Uniting of Europe (1958). For other influential works, see Leon Lindberg, The
Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration and Philippe Schmitter,
Neo-Neo-functionalism (2004).
50 For example the French Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950 (proposing the
nascent institution that would one day become the European Union) embodies
the neofunctionalist notion that narrowly tailored technical institutions of an
economic nature could evolve far beyond their humble beginnings:
"Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be
built through concrete achievements which first create a defacto solidarity. The
coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the ageold opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place
concern these two countries. With this aim in view, the French Government
proposes that action be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point. It
proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be
placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an
organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe. The
pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting
up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the
federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have
long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have
been the most constant victims."
See Press Conference, Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister (May 9,
1950), transcript available at www.robert-schuman .orglrobert-schuman/
declaration2.htm.
51 See Ernst Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (1975).
49
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1960s, Haas became disillusioned that the predicted transfer of loyalties had not materialized in his expected timeframe. 52 Regardless of
the vagaries of their fashionability, most of the insights from functionalism and neofunctionalism are more or less taken for granted today
among the architects of Europe's future and are now subsumed into
what has become regime theory and constructivism. 53
In fact, looking back almost a century since functionalism's
founding, the theory's early adherents seem almost prescient in their
presaging of the development of the international system generally
over the course of the twentieth century. The organizations that had
universal pretentions such as the League of Nations and the United
Nations have generally not lived up to their founder's aspirations, and
grand schemes for world government, fashionable in the periods
following both world wars, never came close to getting off the ground.
What has been successful have been functionally focused international
organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the Bretton
Woods organizations, the World Health Organization, the International Labour Organization and the like. While the United Nations
lays claim to many as nominally part of the "UN family," in reality
most important international organizations are created by independent treaties and function independently of the United Nations in all
important matters. As functionalism predicted, these organization
were established because of a perceived need to address concrete
problems of a transnational nature and have tended to accrue greater
powers incrementally over time. They have also had important spillover effects on the global system as a whole. As the current saliency of
the discussion over fragmentation demonstrates, these organization
have developed a complex ecology that has evolved into an institutional order commonly thought of as our system of global governance.
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For our purposes, what can be most productively distilled from
functionalism and neofunctionalism are the insights that the greatest
political impetus for the establishment of a new international organization are concrete problems that can be m ost effectively addressed
internationally, that single regimes are more likely to be politically
viable than overarching constitutional schemes, and that over time
such organizations are likely to grow in influence as they gain the
loyalties of their constituents . As I will now discuss, these insights
from functionalism can help us understand why the creation of a
Global Parliamentary Assembly (GPA) is now a viable political
project.

IV FUNCTIONALISM, INEQUALITY, AND THE
VIABILITY OF A GLOBAL PARLIAMENTARY
ASSEMBLY
Critics claim that a GPA is a utopian project that cannot be realized. 54
In making this assertion they conflate the introduction of an independent functionalist representative institution of limited powers with
grand legalist schemes for comprehensive world government. They
confuse the step-by-step organic vision of global institutional development that the functionalists saw as the practical way forward with
the revolutionary one that they considered unworkable. Certainly, a
parliament of a plenary nature is a unique kind of functional institution, different from more narrowly-focused organizations designed
to address discreet areas of governance. Nevertheless, it meets the
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functionalist test of being a self-contained entity with its own specific
mission, and after over half a century of proliferating functional
organizations, global system coherence can be most effectively
achieved by an institution whose function is to link these organizations. Mitrany, himself, anticipated the potential need for such an
institution 55 and prescribed that it be conceived with reference to the
same functionalist principles as apply to the initiation of other international organizations:
As the whole sense of this particular method is to let activities be
organized as the need for joint action arises and is accepted, it
would be out of place to lay down in advance some formal plan for
the coordination of various functions. Coordination too, would in
that sense have to corne about functionally.56
In this period of authoritarian resurgence, if the international system
is to meaningfully further democracy by example (rather than mere
rhetoric), it is appropriate that a representative parliament would play
this coordination role. Because it is well established in the popular
imagination that parliaments promulgate laws and oversee agencies of
government, a GPA, once realized, would be poised to evolve over
time into playing a central role in the international system as the
vertical link to the citizenry and the horizontal link between the
various international organizations.
True, however, to the functionalist understanding of how the
international system develops incrementally, the GPA should not
initially be given formal powers of law-making and oversight. At this
point in history such a bold grant of authority would almost certainly
be rejected by governments jealous of their own prerogatives. In
accepting such a concession to reality, the question then becomes
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"The question will be asked . . . in what manner and to what degree the various
functional agencies that may thus grow up would have to be linked to each
other and articulated as parts of a more comprehensive organization. It should
be clear that each agency could work by itself, but that does not exclude the
possibility of some of them or all being bound in some way together, if it
should be found needful or useful to do so." David Mitrany, A Working Peace
System, p. 107. That indeed is the test.
Ibid .
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whether a GPA lacking in formal powers could actually have an
impact on income distribution and by extension the global economy.
I have rehearsed arguments above that globalization has exacerbated the problem of economic inequality, that the resulting lack of
aggregate demand threatens the health of the global economy, and
that the domestic realm is limited in its ability to redress the problem.
A GPA could provide the political underpinnings for such redress.
Unlike the current configuration of power, a GPA would facilitate
citizens' ability to organize transnationally, and it would overcome the
capacity of those who wish to maintain the economic status quo to
block equality initiatives by winning the day in single jurisdictions.
Able to coalesce in the parliament's democratic space, supporters of
greater economic equality could petition the organization to endorse
their programs. Despite the GPA's lack of formal powers, as the
world's only body with a direct claim to represent the global citizenry
as a whole, its decisions would likely be very influential and serve as
reference points for discussion and debate.
As the planet's organized citizenry began to reconfigure itself
beyond the limitations of separate and discreet orbits around national
parliaments into a new common orbit around a GPA, over time the
parliament's formal powers might well come to reflect this new political reality. Not only would the organized citizenry be inclined toward
supporting the legal force of legislative results that were fashioned in
response to their input, but an existing GPA could powerfully lobby
governments on behalf of expanding its own powers . In a world where
democratic elections have become the litmus test for legitimate governance at the local, provincial and national levels, GPA's claim to
exercise increasing authority in the name of the global citizenry would
be hard to resist.
If a parliament would give an effective global voice to those representing the less economically well off, then wouldn't those powerful
elements of the economic elite whose wage costs and tax burdens
have been kept low by the current global configuration of power resist
the GPA based upon their perception of self-interest? No doubt many
would. As I have discussed, however, everyone has a shared interest in
a global economy that can function at as close to full capacity as
possible. It is said in the United States that President Franklin
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Roosevelt "saved capitalism" by using Keynesian tools to create a
social safety net and stimulate demand in response to the Great
Depression. 57 Many in the moneyed class opposed Roosevelt, but
with his core of support among the working class, enough believed it
to be either ethical or in their own enlightened self-interest to support
him, for his plans to be implemented. As this discussion of economic
inequality reveals, a GPA is at least in part about establishing a global
political structure that could support a social safety net, and the same
dynamic could at some point potentially play out in its creation.
It is one thing, of course, for a functional argument to be useful
and viable as a practical political project and quite another to actually
get the institution off the ground. The potential organizational catalyst for such a parliament has been building primarily around the
German based, Campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary
Assembly.58 The organization holds conferences, issues papers, and
builds political support for an international parliament. To date, over
1,000 past and present national parliamentarians and other moral
authority figures have endorsed the Campaign's call for a parliament
associated with the United Nations. 59
Mirroring these organizational developments has been a growing
academic discourse. In addition to the work that Richard Falk and
I have done proposing a GPA, leading scholars of cosmopolitan
democracy such as Daniele Archibugi and David Held are widely
cited,60 and many others have contributed to the broader discussion
of global democracy.61
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See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Crisis of the Old Order;
The Corning of the New Deal; and The Politics of Upheaval (1959) (arguing
famously that Roosevelt saved capitalism from self-destruction and preserved
democracy from authoritarianism of both the left and right) .
See the Campaign's website at www.unpacampaign.org/
http://en.unpacampaign.org!supportlindex.php.
For representative works, see Daniele Archibugi and David Held (eds.)
Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order (1995); Daniele
Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan
Democracy (2008).
The literature in the field has grown large. For a representative sampling of
works by those both supporting a parliamentary approach and those opposing
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Finally, and most importantly, the project for the first time has
found its way onto the United Nations agenda. Both the United
Nations Human Rights Council and the General Assembly have
begun considering the matter. In October of2011 the Human Rights
Council adopted Resolution 18/6 calling for "the promotion of a
democratic and just international order,,,62 and in December of
2012, the General Assembly adopted Resolution NRes/67/175 on
"the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order.,,63
In their respective resolutions, each of the bodies in very general
language affirms that a democratic and equitable international order
requires "the promotion and consolidation of transparent, democratic,
just and accountable international institutions in all areas of cooperation, in particular through the implementation of the principle of full
and equal participation in their respective decision-making me chanisms.,,64 The latest General Assembly resolution A/Res/681175 passed
in December 2013 goes further, and in more specific language declares
that everyone is "entitled to a democratic and equitable international
order,,,65 and that among the requirements of such an order is "the
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H.R.C. Res 18/6, UN Doc. AlHRC/RES18/6 (October 13, 2011) .
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H .R.C. Res 18/6, UN Doc. AlHRC/RES18/6 (October 13, 2011) . G.A.
Res. 67/175, ~ 4(g), UN Doc. A RES/67/175 (December 20 2012).
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right to equitable participation of all, without any discrimination, in
domestic and global decision-making. ,,66 This places within the realm
of international discussion how all seven billion citizens on the planet
can equitably participate in global decision-making without discrimination outside of some sort of parliamentary structure.
The Human Rights Council in its resolution 18/6, decided to
establish a mandate for an independent expert on the prom otion of
a democratic and equitable international order in part to, "identify
best practices in the promotion and protection of a d emocratic international order at the local, national, regional and international
levels,,,67 and the General Assembly in its resolution calls for cooperation with the independent expert. 68
The independent expert, Alfred de Zayas, in his subsequent
reports to both the Human Rights Council 69 and the General Assembly has called for consideration of a parliament. 7o H e wrote, for
example, in his report to the General Assembly:
Among other civil society initiatives, the launching of a World
Parliamentary Assembly or United Nations Parliamentary
Assembly is worth exploring. As fonner Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated: "A United Nations Parliamentary
Assembly - a global body of elected representatives - could
invigorate our institutions of global governance with
unprecedented democratic legitimacy, transparency and
accountability." The idea is to remedy democracy deficits by
giving voice to global public opinion, including citizens in global
decision-making through elected officials. Such an Assembly
could be set up by a vote of the General Assembly under
66
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Article 22 of the Charter or it could be created on the basis of a
new international treaty between governments, followed by an
agreement linking it to the United Nations. Neither mechanism
requires Charter amendment or reform. Global decisions would
gain greater legitimacy through citizen input and involvement in
an independent World Assembly with consultative functions, or
in a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly representing people
as well as states. 71
De Zayas recommends Article 22 of the Charter and an independent
treaty as the two most viable vehicles for creating the GPA. I agree. 72
The Charter under Article 22 provides that "the General Assembly may
establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.,,7 3 Article 22 has the advantage that, unlike the
treaty process, a General Assembly resolution could bring the GPA into
being without the cumbersome requirement of state ratification. 74
Resorting to Article 22, however, is not without its own drawbacks. Perhaps most significant, garnering the requisite support for
the approval of the GPA within the General Assembly is likely to
require problematic political concessions. A lowest common denominator parliament, for example, might allow for authoritarian regimes
to appoint members to the GPA, or even worse, orchestrate elections
that would produce sham results. This would undermine the legitimacy of the organization and compromise its ability to act as a counterweight to authoritarianism. 75
This is why Richard Falk and I have favored the GPA being
initiated as an independent treaty body76 adopted by whichever
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See Andrew Strauss, "On the First Branch of Global Governance," Widener
L. Rev., 13 (2007), p. 347 (describing four potential ways of creating a global
parliament and concluding that the treaty approach is the most practicable).
UN Charter, art. 22.
For further discussion, see Andrew Strauss, "On the First Branch of Global
Governance," pp. 352- 4 .
Ibid.
Professor Falk and I have made the case for a treaty-based approach in several
publications, including Foreign Affairs and The Nation. See Richard Falk and
Andrew Strauss, "Toward Global Parliament," ForeignAfj., 80 (2001), p. 212;

216

International Law and Its Discontents

internationally progressive countries were willing to be pioneers. 77
Countries that are truly supportive of the GPA's democratic mission
are likely to create the best, most democratic organization . Even
twenty to thirty such countries (as long as they are economically
and geographically diverse) would be enough to found the GPA, and
opposing countries in the General Assembly could not stand in their
way. Once the parliamentary initiative gained momentum, their less
enthusiastic peers in the United Nations would have an incentive to
take part rather than be sidelined, and there might even come a time
when it would be politically untenable for authoritarian governments to deny their people the right to vote in the only globally
elected body.
The treaty agreed to by the founders would establish the legal
structure for elections to be held within their national territories
including a voting system and electoral districts. In addition, an
operational framework for the GPA, including its mandate and
limitations on its powers would be included in the treaty as would
a provision for future accession by other countries. Any country
could later join the GPA so long as it was willing to meet its obligations under the treaty, the most important of which would be to
allow its citizens to vote representatives to the GPA in free and fair
elections.
The treaty could include provisions defining the GPA's initial role
vis-a-vis the United Nations, and once established the parliament
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Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, "Toward a Global Parliament," The
Nation, September 22, 2003, p. 28.
A standalone treaty organization whose membership may not be the same as
the United Nations is not a novel concept. Most major international bodies
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could enter into a relationship agreement with that body.78 Though
begun independent of the United Nations, the GPA would be meant
to strengthen it. Part of the GPA's treaty-based responsibilities, for
example, could be to weigh in with its own vote on issues such as
global income inequality. General Assembly resolutions are themselves largely recommendatory, and by insinuating a democratic voice
into the process, the resolutions that passed both bodies would be
more noticed and deemed more legitimate. Backed by the weight of
popular authority over time, perhaps the General Assembly and the
GPA could evolve together into a truly bicameral legislative system
capable of producing binding legislation.

V CONCLUSION: RETURNING TO EINSTEIN

AND FREUD
While Freud did not accept the presumed supposition that a compelling case for a world authority to avoid war could in itself be the
impetus for such an authority, he did maintain a dynamic view of
history. Influenced profoundly by German Romanticism, he believed
that human civilization evolves as the individual psyche evolves, in the
eternal struggle between the instincts of love (Eros, sexuality, that
which unites) and death (aggressiveness and destruction). 79 In this
sense Freud and Einstein, together with the politically scientific functionalists, all share a common perspective that embraces the reality of
historical change. And, by almost any measure, we are living in a time
of tremendous historical dynamism.
Viewed from the vantage point of the individual human psyche,
today more of us on the planet than ever before have access to the
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The UN Charter provides that: "The Economic and Social Council may enter
into agreements with any" agency "established by intergovernmental
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art. 63, para. 1; ibid . at art. 57, para.!. These agreements "defin[e] the terms
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education that allows us, in Freud's teons, to be "strengthening the
intellect" so as to "master our instinctive lives."ao Seen alternatively
from Einstein's rationalist orientation, the increasingly rapid globalization of the planetary social order that technology has wrought has
intensified the reflective case that we create a viable international
system. Similarly, as I have argued in this chapter, in this globalized
world, the dynamics of the functionalist variant of the political scientific
tradition leads self-interested actors in the direction of collective action.
The extent to which the dynamism of the system will translate into
any particular global institutional innovation is unknown. If planetary
civilization, however, is to continue the long-teon trend toward parliamentary democracy and toward greater planetary social integration, then presumably these two trend lines will at some point
converge in the establishment of a globally democratic institution.
That day may not be as far off as some people might imagine. For
decades now the international community has been experimenting
successfully with transnational parliamentary institutions, the most
well-known of which is the citizen elected European Parliament. a1
Our functionalist study of the role that income inequality could play
in the establishment of a GPA provides a framework for understanding the social mechanisms animating such an institutional development and presages the role that such an institution could play.
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